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ABSTRACT
In order to survive in today’s business environment characterized by strong competition,
it is no longer enough to be an efficient company. The efficiency in the entire value
chain of a company is necessary to satisfy today’s demanding customer in term of
quality-cost-time. One of the tools used by many Japanese companies since the 1960s to
satisfy the quality-cost-time requirements is the proactive cost management approach,
widely known as Target Cost Management (TCM).
While many researches related to TCM have been conducted during this last
decade, they are more focused on the TCM process of top companies in a value chain.
The importance of suppliers’ involvement into the TCM process of their customers is
recognized, but it is still under-explored. In this paper, an attempt is made to explore
how suppliers in the Japanese automobile industry contribute to the effectiveness of
TCM process of the auto-makers through information sharing between the two parties.
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1. Introduction
Within this last decade, many studies have revealed numerous aspects of TCM system,
enhancing understanding of the proactive cost management and reduction system as it is
practiced in various range of industries in Japan.’ Recently, other researches have showed the
widespread use of TCM throughout American and European companies (Hovarth, 1993 ;
Ansari, 1996).
One can remember for example in the Japanese automobile industry, it is estimated that
up to about 70 percent of a vehicle components and parts are outsourced from different
suppliers and subcontractors. And beside that even independent suppliers deal with their
customers on the basis of long term contract. Therefore in practice, TCM process is not only a
company internal activities. It requires the involvement of all participants in a company’s
internal and external value chain as well.
While it is recognized that suppliers involvement in TCM process (as it is practiced by
companies at the top of value chains) is also one of its crucial factors, TCM process from
suppliers’ perspectives is under-explored. Therefore, an attempt is made through case studies in
this paper to explore how suppliers’ activities are organized to support the TCM system
practiced by their customers.
Our cases are based on a series of interviews conducted in Japan with some parts and
components suppliers in the automobile industry . The interviews were conducted from
September 1996 to November 1996. The cases presented here are those of two independent
suppliers, both are primary suppliers. Case studies offer insights into real-life events and
contextual conditions that are lost in a statistical or historical survey of the entire industry,
though they cannot be generalized to the entire population. Before to explore our cases we will
briefly review the framework of assemblers-suppliers relationships in the Japanese automobile
industry.
‘ From 1977 to 1996, more than 200 articles and books about TCM have been written worldwide. But more than
half of them are in Japanese. Others, mainly in English have been written mostly by Japanese scholars and
researchers or co-authored by them. See Nihon Kaikei Kenkyu Gakkai (Japanese Accounting Association), 1996
(pP. 153-184) for detailed bibliography.
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2. Framework of Assemblers-Suppliers Relationships in Japan
As in many other Japanese industries, the automobile industry is a pyramidal structure. Though
there are 10 automakers in the Japanese automobile industry,~ they can be classified within three
main groups: Toyota Group (Toyota, Daihatsu, and Hino); Nissan Group (Nissan, Nissan
Diesel, and Fuji); and others (Honda, Isuzu, Mazda, Mitsubishi, and Suzuki).
These automakers are built below some 10,000 parts makers (Abe, 1990). Among parts
makers, there are primary suppliers that directly supply the automakers. Then in turn, the
primary suppliers organize their own suppliers— the secondary parts makers. And each
secondary supplier heads a tertiary group of yet smaller suppliers, and so on (Womack et al.,
1991; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991).
Exhibit 1: Assemblers-Suppliers Transactions’ Matrix
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2 On Friday, April 12, 1996, Ford Motor Co. and Mazda Motor Corporation have agreed that Ford increases its
equity in M-azdafrom 24.4 percent to 33.4 percent. The move puts Mazda under the control of Ford because it will
allow the exercise of a veto at Mazda shareholders’ meetings. So legally speaking, MazdaMotor Corporation is no
longer a Japanese automaker.
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From the strategic viewpoint, one might think that suppliers work only with other
members of the same group. This is not always true. If it was true, a company such as Honda
could not exist since it does not have what can be referred to as Japanese keiretsu system.3 h
practice, there are many cases of competing automakers’ sourcing the same type of parts and
components from the same suppliers as illustrated by the exhibit 1.
Beside the fact that many suppliers are shared among different automakers’ groups,
Daihatsu and Hino have assembled vehicles for Toyota; and Fuji and Nissan Diesel have done
the same for Nissan. Lnpractice, the web of transaction in the Japanese automobile industry is
very complex as hypothesized on the exhibit 2.
Exhibit 2: Transactions’ Web in the Automobile Industry
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Subcontracting is a characteristic of manufacturing companies worldwide. However,
many studies have showed that the Japanese automobile industry is characterized by a higher
rate of subcontracting than its Western counterparts (Cusumano, 1985; Odaka et al., 1988; and
Smitka, 1991).
The contract or trading relationship is a long term one. Japanese suppliers usually
produce a complete subsystems of components; they have greater asset specificity and are
customer concentrated (Nishiguchi, 1994). The interdependence between assemblers and
suppliers is so strong that it was referred to as ‘quasi integration’ by Aoki (1990). However as
3 Keiretsu here means the combines of large-scale business with suppliers. According to Nishiguchi (1994, p.113),
large Japanese manufacturers began to invest seriously in this kind of relationships from the late 1950s onward to
increase their control over some of their major subcontractors-financially, managerially, and technologically—in
order to ensure that they could produce the same quality products as could the in-house operation.
4By competing automakers, we mean automakers which do not belong to the same group.
emphasized by Womack et al. (1991), it can be noticed that some parts and components critical
to the success of a vehicle are not subcontracted:
The lean assembler doesn ‘tdelegate to the supplier the detail design of certain parts considered vital to
the success of the car, due either to proprietary technology or to the consumer’s perception of the
product. Leading examples of parts usually reserved for the assembler’s in house supply divisions are
engines, transmissions, major body panels, and, increasingly, the electronic management systems that
coordinate the activities of many vehicles systems (p. 147).
With exception of Honda, each automaker has cooperative association(s) of which its
suppliers are members (Odaka et al., 1988; Smitka, 1991; Sake, 1995). An automaker’s
association of suppliers is not limited to keiretsu suppliers. It includes both keiretsu suppliers
and outside ones. As a result of this mixture, some suppliers might simultaneously belong to,
for example, Toyota’s association and the Nissan one (Ueda, 1989; Miwa, 1990; Sako 1995).
l%ough recreational activities are organized, the cooperative association mainly allows
the sharing of various business information between an automaker and its suppliers. However,
automakers still promote inter-supplier rivalry by making public the ranking of suppliers’
performance and by procuring individual parts from approximately three different suppliers
(Wada, 1991; Aoki, 1988; Smitka, 1991; Takeishi and Cusumano, 1995).
In their turn, suppliers are members of their own association of suppliers (kyoroku-kai)
where new findings and better ways to make parts might be shared. This inter-suppliers relation
is as important as assembler-supplier relationship for technology diffusion in the industry and
overall performance (Sake, 1995).
In what concerns assembler-supplier interactions, Japanese automakers can be seen as
very demanding or strict about quality, cost, on-time delivery, and manufacturing technology.
But when a supplier fails to meet the expected requirements, the automaker usually tries to
discover the reasons for the problems and to push the subcontractors to solve them at the source.
Their approach to dealing with their suppliers is referred to as ‘problem solving oriented’ by
Nishiguchi (1994). With some additional hypotheses, the approach is referred to as ‘voice
relationship’ by Helper and Sako (1995).
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Exhibit 3: Interaction during the Development Process
1. SupplieFProprieta~ Parts 2. Black Box Drawings
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Studies of assembler-supplier relationships have tended to focus on product
development. Asanuma (1984, 1989) analyzed and described the assemblers-suppliers’ design
information flow. He defined three categories of supplier: marketed goods, drawings
approved, and drawings supplied ; depending on how suppliers’ products are drawn and
consequently how do they interact with automakers. Other studies have confirmed that Japanese
suppliers are integrated in the automakers’ vehicle development process (Clark, 1989; Womack
et al., 1991; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Ueda, 1995; Liker et al. 1995; Okano 1995).
Although English term used are different with of those of Asanuma, Clark and Fujimoto
(1991), also classified involvement of suppliers in the automobile development process within
3 groups, though basically there is no difference about their assignments. Depending on how
suppliers’ products are drawn and consequently how do they interact with automakers,
fundamentally the three main groups can be defined as follow (See exhibit 3) for the flow of
information during the development process):
(1) Supplier proprietary parts: typically in this case a part (from concept to
manufacturing) is entirely developed by a supplier;
(2) Black box drawings: in this category an assembler conceives the basic design and a
supplier performs engineering detail and then manufactures;
(3) Detailed-controlled drawings: basic and detail engineering performed by an
assembler and a supplier manufactures.
A survey by Clark and Fujimoto (1991) identified regional differences between Europe,
Japan, and United States as depicted in exhibit 4. The study by Cusumano and Takeishi (1991)
also supported the fact that Japanese automakers rely more on the black box parts system.
Exhibit 4: RegionalProportionof Suppliers’ Parts
Suppliers’ proprieta~ Black Box Parts Detail-Controlled Parts
Parts
Japan 8% 62% 30%
United States 370 16% 81%
Europe 7% 39% 54%
Source: Adapted from Clark and Fujimoto (1991, p. 145)
Many other studies have argued that the efficiency of Japanese assembler-supplier
relationships’ has greatly contributed to the international competitiveness of Japanese
automakers(Cole and Yakushiji [1984]; Cusumano [1985]; Womack et al. [1991]; and
%
Nishiguchi [1994]). For example, Clark and Fujimoto’s study of 1991 showed that suppliers
involvement in the product development process in Japan accounted for one-third of
automakers’ engheering hours in the new car development process. This gives and advantage
which helps to make Japanese automakers’ development time shorter than their Western
counterparts.
The ‘relation-specific skill’, which derives from the stability of long term trading
relationships, leads to high performance since suppliers acquire customers’ experiences,
contribute to design and development and invest in asset specificity (Asanuma, 1989). Beside
this, defect rates of parts supplied by Japanese suppliers are also very small in comparison with
Western suppliers (Womack et al., 1991; Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991; Nishiguchi, 1994).
3. Informatz”on Sham”ngin TCM Process
This section is mainly based on two case studies. At the request of the companies involved, their
names and products have to be disguised. Therefore, we nicknamed companies concerned as
Company X, and Company Y; and did not mention the names of their products.
3.1 Company X
Company X is an independent supplier which has more than 5,000 employees in Japan, and
three product lines (which lead the company to have three divisions). The main product line
(nicknamed P) which accounted for about 74 % of its revenues in 1994, is supplied to almost all
Japanese passenger cars’ makers— Daihatsu, Isuzu, Honda, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, and
Toyota. Company X market of P is the second largest is Japan and the third in the world.
Company X has other affiliated companies worldwide. However, the case here is mainly
focused on product P and the interaction between Company X and its Japanese main customer,
one of the leading Japanese automaker.
1. Inter-firms Product Development Process and Long Term Cost Management
The vehicle concept activities (development aim, fundamental design, styling, and so on) are
exclusively carried out by the automaker, considering all the requirements of market and
technology, the analysis of competitors, industry, and so on. Independently, Company X also
carries different in-house activities of its products (See Exhibit 5) for the Inter-organizational
Development Program). 9
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After a vehicle concept and styling have been approved, almost three years before the
beginning of mass production, Company X is contacted and sends its engineers to the
automaker’s development center as guest engineers for a certain period of time. Those
engineers send back crucial information on quality, performance, and so on to company X’s
R&D center. It is important to notice here that those engineers not merely contemplate the
automaker’s one. Whenever possible, they make proposals for rationalizing the product. If it is
consideed mutually beneficial and technologically possible, the design can even be changed to
fit these new requirements.
During this stage different negotiations and interactions are carried out both with the
customer’s design department and purchasing department. After reaching the agreements on
different targets, the product management committee begins to plan, coordinate, and control
different in-house activities as described above (See Exhibit 5).
In-house New Product Management Committee
QObjective
The main objective of the committee is to decide on all activities from the planning stage to the
after sales service, and on the quality of the product.
QStarting
The head of the Quality Assurance Department usually presides over the committee. After
different agreements have been reached, each business department is told what his
responsibility is and starts with its plan.
Generally, the committee has to meet in the two following cases: (1) When there is an
introduction of new model, or model change; (2) When a new production process, or technology
is introduced. In the case when only a part of Production Department is concerned, it is not
necessary to call a meeting. The head of the Production Department is going to analysis the
case.
Q The Structure of the Committee
Basically, the committee structure is as described in the exhibit 6. However, depending on the
customer and the vehicle model concerned, there are some variations.
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Q The Operation of the Committee
The length of activities of the committee is very flexible. The duration of operations depends on
the customer, the type of vehicle, the technology implicated, and so on. Company X works very
hard to reduce the average lead time. At the beginning, the design department provides the
drawings. And the committee assigns different targets to each department and division, and asks
each to constuct its own plan within a determinate period of time. Before meeting for the first
time, it requires each department to submit its plan. Then during the meeting, different targets
are set that will allow to company to fully satisfy its customer requirements while still securing
its own business. In practice, Company X develops its product and conducts its strategic cost
management activities linearly or in parallel with a customer.
2. Short-term Cost Planning System
Company X deals with almost all Japanese passenger cars’ makers as stated above. Since each
automaker has its requirements and each vehicle is specific, products are not standardized as
such. Company X has to produce many varieties of the same products to accommodate each
customer and each model. So, the cost planning process is based on standard costs. The
planning costs include material costs, conversion costs, selling and administrative expenses.
Thus focus of cost analysis is internally oriented.
The standards are based on the results of the previous period, and different provisions
made by management for the new period. Usually, this plan is established for one year, starting
in April—the beginning of fiscal year in Japan. This plan is made by division, then by product,
and then by parts. At the end-of-year, necessary adjustments are made and actual costs are
calculated. Exhibit 7 depicts the relationship between standards (estimated costs), real costs,
and productivity for a period.
As it can be seen form the exhibit, standards are used only for the planning purpose, not
for the control. Continuous improvement of activities, such as work processes, setup times,
operating procedures and so on, are conducted during a period to improve the performance of
activities that increase customer satisfaction. Therefore, real costs are usually lower than the
planned one. Company X’s managers favor standard costs because it is easier to calculate and
the huge work that Kaizen budgeting might require, if variety and specificity of each customer
and each vehicle are taken into account.
Exhibit 7: Relationshipsbetween Estimated Costs, Actual Costs, and Productivity in Company X
Estimated
Actual
4. Management of the Survival
Though there is cooperation between Company X and its customer, its survival depends greatly
on it being efficient business with the parent company is not taken for granted. Company X has
to be efficient as well to secure its survival. Some of the measures taken by Company X
management to monitor its effectiveness and performance are:
l
l
l
l
l
The company continually provides programs for training and upgrading the staff.
Each day, the Production Department restudies the existing manufacturing process
on at least one product component.
The company strives to further strengthen its R&D capability so that new and
unrivaled technology and products should be created.
The company strives to improve its profit performance by adjusting the corporate
structure whenever possible for maximum eftlciency.
Intensification of in-house research and development cooperation, including
subsidiaries, to allow the smooth exchanges of information between different
business fields to strengthen the superiority of the corporate-wide products.
3.2 Company Y
Company Y is a family owned company. It was created in the 1950s and is an independent
supplier which has about 900 employees in Japan. The company has three factories and many
others facility in Japan, and two other plants outside Japan—in South East Asia. Company Y
has three divisions.
The automobile related division is the most important. The company has been
continually dealing with three automakers. The case made here is mainly focused on the
interaction between Company Y and its main automaker customer with which they have been
in business relation for more than 30 years.
1. Inter-jirms Product Development Process and Cost Management
Exhibit8: Product Development Schedule
Ist Year ~ 2nd Year ~ 3rd Year ~ 4th Year
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QPlanning Stage
During this stage, different activities are mainly conducted by the automaker. Confidential
information is gathered from different sources: sales department, dealers’ opinions, market
research, and so on.
After the decision about the creation of a car model is taken, studies on overall
development aim, concept and design of a vehicle are conducted. Decision about costs, quality,
performance, sales volume, profit and, other development targets are made in this stage.
QDesign Stage
This stage is referred to as design-in stage. Suppliers engineers are located at the automaker’s
product development center, and jointly design parts. Different negotiations about
buyin~selling are carried out during this stage and whenever possible, final decision is taken.
Once the agreement on part requirements is reached, Company Y set its different targets
and starts its in-house Cost Reduction (CR) activities. The automaker’s target cost is its target
price. From this target price, the target profit margin is deducted. The difference between target
price and target profit margin is the target cost the company has to achieve. Target profit margin
is secured by keeping costs below the agreed price, without trading off product quality and
performance.
It is interesting to notice here that cost/price negotiations are carried out both with the
customer’s design department and purchasing department as illustrated above (See exhibit 9).
Usually, the bid of the purchasing department is lower than that of the design department. But
whatever the case, the in-house product development and cost reduction program only start after
the agreements are reached with the customer. After reaching the agreements on different
targets, the product management committee is set up to plan, coordinate, and control different
in-house activities.
Exhibit 9: Target Cost/Price Negotiation Pattern
H
Company Y
reduction activities
I Department -
interacts its development and production departments to carry out cost
by studying different VE/VA approaches; then the design is made
accordingly. The length of time depends on the type or kind of a part. But generally, it varies
from 6 to 12 months. To shorten the development time, Company Y used to involve its
collaborate companies (Kyoroku Kizisha) in the process.
In order to improve efficiency both of design and production, the automaker and its
suppliers alike usually agree to ‘commonize’ some parts and components whenever possible.
Communization allows both suppliers and automaker to lower some development costs,
investment costs, and the rate of defective parts.
L2Prototype Stage
During this stage, the automaker requests all suppliers to bring their drawings for examination
and approval. Drawings are submitted along with other critical information for the biding. Prior
or during the planning process, in the case a supplier have presented the state-of-art products,
which appealed and got approval of the automaker, the market is assured for the first two
models in which the part is going to be used.
In other cases, suppliers usually compete for the market. For Company Y’s main
products, there are often five to six other companies to compete with. The cost information to
provide either for biding or each semestral negotiation includes the following items (See exhibit
lo):
Exhibit 10: Structureof Cost InformationSubmittedto the Customer
A. MaterialCosts
B. Part Costs
C. Processing Costs
D. Mold Costs (Amortization)
E. Administrative and Selling Expenses
5% of (A + B) for storage expenses
30% of(C) for packing and transportation
10’%of (D) for maintenance
F. Profit Margin
G. TOTAL (A+ B+ C+ D+ E+F)
It is necessary to notice that, even in the case were estimated costs submitted by a
supplier are equal or below the target costs set previously, the contract is not assured unless an
effective VA program to lower cost during the life cycle of a product is provided. In other
words, a supplier can be assured of a contract only in the case where all requirements
concerning quality, performance, delivery, and an effective cost reduction program for the
entire life cycle are met. Suppliers can request the automaker’s engineers to visit their plant to
study with them how to lower costs any time there is a need.
It is during this stage that Company Y usually makes its final decision about specific
investments in tools, molds, inspection tools and so on. Sometimes, the automaker can provide
the necessary tools or machines needed for the tasks under specific agreements.
The next important step in this stage is the trial of a prototype vehicle. The automaker
always requires the prototype parts made of the same materials and using the same processes
that are going to be used during the coming mass production stage. Prototype parts are made and
brought to the automaker for the trial. They have to satisfy all the requirements of the prototype
drawings.
For parts that do not meet the requirements, an urgent request for improvements is made.
And since the automaker rarely adjusts its development schedule because of a supplier, speed is
of the ultimate importance for a supplier to carry out necessary tasks in order to reach the overall
goals for a part. After the improvement of all failures in the first trial, the automaker carries out
a second trial which will lead to the production pilot; which in its turn, will lead to the mass-
production.
The ordinary time from the conception to the market is about 42 months. However,
many automakers are seeking ways to shorten this period to 24 months in order to lower
development costs, During these 42 months and thereafter, the automaker and suppliers
(affiliated as well as independent suppliers) jointly work together in order to provide the final
customers with a high quality, innovative, and low cost vehicle.
2. Value Analysis
The philosophy of cost reduction is very strong for the automaker and its suppliers alike. To
achieve significant cost reduction, products are designed with cost in mind and cost reduction
activities are being carried out as early as possible in the planning process. But still cost
reduction efforts continue during the mass-production stage, therefore covering the entire life
cycle of a product.
Automakers are aware of the fact that costs should decline as a result of learning effect
that improves productivity, VA efforts, and so on. Therefore, price also should decline
throughout the life cycle of a product. During the mass-production stage, prices of each part and
component are lowered by a fixed rate of 570 every six months. As was described above, beside
satisfying the first target cost the contract is not assured unless a supplier can assure an effective
VA program to lower cost during the entire life cycle of a product.
To be profitable, a supplier has to continually improve factory productivity by
undergoing various VA activities. The cost savings on parts either derived by the supplier’s
effort beyond those agreed upon, or derived by the supplier’s effort but within the agreed range,
or derived through joint-efforts are all shared equally.
3. Selling Volume Fluctuation
Usually, a model change is made after four year of mass-production. But since huge costs of
investment are spent during the development process, sometimes a model can wait until the
sixth year if the predicted sales volumes are not reached in the fourth year.
A range of predicted selling volumes Lsestimated by the automaker’s sales department.
Since this range is taken into account in the contract, it is the responsibility of the automaker to
achieve sales within this range. However, various conditions might rise that could affect the
contract:
1. If a part is going to be used as such in a concurrent model, this means that supplier’s
volume of sales is going to increase. Therefore, the automaker asks for greater price
reduction.
2. If the range of predicted selling volumes is exceeded, again the automaker asks for
greater price reduction.
3. If after the forth year, the selling volume is still below the predicted one, the
automaker’s managers have to decide either to withdraw the model or to extend its
production for one or two more years. If the decision is taken to withdraw the
model, the automaker will pay the salvage value of specific investments made by its
suppliers for its project. Depending on a case, a supplier can also be asked to
continue supplying the part for the next model.
4. Management of Survival
Due to various macroeconomics’ constraints, the national production of automobiles has been
declining and automakers have been transplanting outside the Japanese border. Beside these
factors, Company Y is facing strong competition from other competitors at home. Its survival
greatly depends on its capability to satisfy its customers’ requirements—high quality and
performance, low cost, variety, speed, reliability, and so on. Its main concerns are continually to
improve its productivity and the value of its products (See exhibit 11). Satisfying the customer
means future business, better outlook for employees, and profit improvement.
Therefore, Company Y managers continuously:
“ Ask the work force for ideas that would reduce costs, raise productivity, and
improve morale. Twice a year, all company’s employees are gathered for what is
called ‘Quality Circle Event’. In total, there are 90 circles countrywide. Each circle
choose a theme about the improvement of factory or any other themes that might
s Ask the work force for ideas that would reduce costs, raise productivity, and
improve morale. Twice a year, all company’s employees are gathered for what is
called :Qua@ Circle Event’. In total, there are 90 circles countrywide. Each circle
choose a theme about the improvement of factory or any other themes that might
strengthen the company’s position and think off it. The findings are announced in
front of all employee.
Beside QC circles, each person is asked to give six suggestions a year. This year up
to now, 560 persons have already provided 4,334 new ideas (about 7,74 per person
on average) that positively influence company performance.
Exhibit 11: CompanyY Means to Sustain its Profitability
Improving productivity
I Cost minimization IA
w
Sustain
profitability
*
Performance/Quality
maximization
Improving vaiue
“ Train people for the effective use of VE/VA which upgrades the value-added
(Automakers give some rewards for that).
l Try to be ahead of competitors by anticipating the trend of the market and final
customers’ needs. So, R&D works hard to relate company goals and objectives to
research and engineering objectives.
“ Upgrade the factory automation and flexibility, essential factors for high quality,
low cost, quit delivery, and production of varieties. In one hand, equipment is
designed so that waste and lead time are eliminated or strictly minimized. And
products are designed to automate the production and avoid waste. mn
4. Conckswn
Customers (either general public or business organization) expect high quality products at
reasonable prices. To remain competitive in today’s business environment, businesses have
continuously to seek ways to lead people and efficiently satisfy customers. In order to satisfy
customers efficiently, a firm needs to maximize its efficiency throughout the entire value chain.
If efficiency is not maximized throughout the entire value chain, costs might rise above those of
rivals and it might be difficult to recoup these higher costs through price increases.
Practitioners and researchers recognize the merit of optimizing product success factors
early in the product life cycle. And since almost 80% or more of a product costs are committed
by the end of the design stage (Yoshikawa et al. 1993; Lorino, 1994; Hongren et al., 1994),
proactive cost management and cost reduction efforts during the preproduction stage is more
efficient than thereafter.s Greater efficiency can be reached if all participants in a business value
chain cooperate smoothly. The role played by suppliers for the effectiveness of proactive cost
management and cost reduction was explored in this paper.
Like automakers that have to satisfy customers needs to survive in a highly competitive
environment, suppliers have to meet automakers—their customers— requirements for a
product critical success factors<ost, quality, innovation, and time—in order to survival.
Sumival of a supplier greatly depends on its capability and ability to satisfy its customers’
requirements—high quality and performance, low cost, variety, speed, and so on. Satisfying the
customer means future business, better outlook for employees, and profit improvement.
Though we can not generalized from only two cases, suppliers (independent ones as well
as keiretsu ones) are involved in the automobile design and development process with specific
targets on performance, quality, and costs. Critical information flow between both sides.
Usually, suppliers engineers are located at an automaker research and development plant and
jointly work with an automaker engineers in order to reach targets. This implies that there are
5Johnson& Kaplan (1987) analysis on the lost of relevance of American companies’ management accounting data
led them to recommend among other things the proactive cost management for better cost reduction rather than
heroic efforts at process improvement and automation for a poorly designed product (see pp. 257-258).
transcendence of organization barriers, and the existence of high level of trust and confidence
among the participants.
While dcweloping their product to meet customer requirements, suppliers concurrently
set their in-house TCM requirements and struggle to meet their different targets. The main
findings of our field research can be summarized as follows:
QSuppliers ’ Role in the Effectiveness of TCM
l Competition among suppliers lead them to be creative in order to secure their profit, Their
in-house TCM requirements or cost reduction programs are tailored to meet specific
customer’s requirements as shown by each case. This leads to the prevalence of high
qualityflow cost culture throughout the value chain.
l Because of long term commitment between assemblers and suppliers, suppliers willingly
undertake necessary research, invest in the development of new materials, processes, and
technologies in order to rationalize their products and reduce costs. In other words,
supplier’s willingness to make specific investments for a customer is sustained by the
horizon of the contract.
“ Inter-organizational product development, the result of transcendence of organization
barriers, is what makes techniques such as value analysis and value engineering more
effective. Beside this, inter-organizational product development enhances inter-
organizational learning which raises technical expertise of suppliers allowing them to
continually upgrading the value-added of their products.
UMain Lessons
The shift in the global economy has led many companies in various industries to seek horizontal
alliances to strengthen their competitiveness. However, vertical strategic alliances are as
important as horizontal ones and cannot be overlooked. Having an efficient supply chain is one
of sources for strategic competitive strength. When links with the supply chain is backed up by
long term commitment, trust, motivation, and consensus between all participants, suppliers are
assured of future orders and are likely to expand their investments in new material, processes,
and technology to support the transactions. D.9-
In contradiction of what some might think, we consider that Japanese assembler-
supplier relationships is firstly economic in nature, therefore transferable beyond the Japanese
border. For firrns+vishing to implement TCM, the lesson is that the focus on technical issues
only will not lead to great success unless there is an environment in which trust, consensus, and
partnerships with suppliers are built.
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